A Critique of Mooney's Deontological Solution to the Problem of Evil

In this essay I will examine and critique Justin Mooney's How to Solve the Problem of Evil: A Deontological Strategy. Mooney offers what at first appears to be a promising approach by employing two strategies — the restriction strategy and the prerogative strategy — to explain how God might allow evil. I'll take each in turn and argue that their reliance on incompatibilist free will and the claim that suffering is indispensable for moral development leave them wanting. I will also suggest that a compatibilist perspective can support a morally valuable world without the need for gratuitous evil.

On the Restriction Strategy

Let me begin with the restriction strategy. Mooney defends the idea that God sometimes must permit certain evils because of moral obligations tied to human freedom. Central to his view is an incompatibilist notion of free will — the idea that genuine freedom requires the ability to choose between clearly defined alternatives of good and evil. Now, I'm not convinced that this is necessary for moral goodness. Under a compatibilist account, free will is better understood as acting in accordance with one's own rational desires and judgments, even if those desires are determined. On this account, it's entirely conceivable that God could create a world where humans always freely choose the good — thereby enhancing, rather than diminishing, their freedom.

To put it another way, the incompatibilist model seems to presuppose that real freedom is only achieved when one can opt for evil as well as good. But if ignorance or weakness of will is what enables one to choose wrongly, aren't these really constraints on freedom rather than genuine expressions of it? In a world where people act on the basis of clear, rational judgment, they would still be free, yet the possibility of moral failure — and the suffering that goes with it — would be off the table. So the kind of free will that Mooney's restriction strategy requires doesn't seem to be the ideal kind of freedom that a morally good world ought to celebrate.

Now consider the idea of "soul-making" — the notion that suffering is necessary for moral growth. Mooney holds that facing and overcoming adversity is essential for developing virtue. However, I contend that moral development need not depend on suffering at all. Just as a person can hone a skill without repeatedly failing at it, so too can one refine one's character through positive, constructive challenges. A world in which every individual steadily cultivates virtues like compassion and wisdom does not require the presence of evil or suffering to be morally meaningful. In short, the assumption that suffering is a sine qua non for soul-making is far from inevitable.

On the Prerogative Strategy

Let's now turn to the prerogative strategy. Here, Mooney claims that God, as a perfect being, might allow evil simply because doing so contributes to a world of genuine moral significance. The idea is that by permitting the possibility of wrong, God ensures that our moral choices truly matter. But I must ask: Is it really necessary for a world to include suffering in order to be meaningful?

I submit that a world in which every action is good can still be rich in moral significance. Even if individuals only had to choose between different gradations of goodness — rather than between good and evil — they would still engage in a process of continual moral improvement. Just as numbers can increase without ever dipping into negativity, moral growth need not require a descent into suffering. In other words, moral meaning can arise from striving for ever-higher virtues without the need to contend with the harsh reality of evil.

Thus, while the prerogative strategy aims to justify evil by appealing to the creation of a "world that matters," it too leans too heavily on the assumption that suffering is indispensable for meaningful moral freedom. When we consider a compatibilist view of free will — one in which genuine freedom and moral significance need not be predicated on the risk of choosing wrongly — the rationale for permitting gratuitous evil becomes even less convincing.

Conclusion

To sum up, both the restriction strategy and the prerogative strategy seem to rest on unnecessary assumptions about the nature of free will and the role of suffering. By insisting on an incompatibilist model of free will and on the indispensability of suffering for moral development, these strategies commit us to a picture of the world that is not the only, nor the best, way to understand moral freedom. A compatibilist account shows that humans can enjoy true freedom and moral significance without having to choose between good and evil or endure needless suffering.

In light of these considerations, I remain unconvinced that Mooney's deontological strategies successfully solve the problem of evil. There is a plausible — and arguably preferable — alternative in which a suffering-free world, populated by beings capable of meaningful, rational moral growth, is entirely compatible with a divine design.