The “They” and the Conscientious Objector as a Possible Response

For Heidegger, the They is that which reduces Dasein’s possibilities for Being. It is when Dasein in its Being-with Others stands in a position of subjection to Others; Others being those other entities in the world in which Dasein does not distinguish itself. The They is a mode of being, a kind of attention to the other that allows the Other to determine its possibilities of Being. How might one resist the allures of the world and resist succumbing to an inauthentic They-Self? Is the conscientious objector perhaps an example of a rejection of the intimations and pressures of the They? In this essay, I will consider the life of Franz Jägerstätter in part and examine whether or not his actions as a conscientious objector deem him as positioning toward an authentic way of living, or if Heidegger would consider this to be inauthentic as well in participating in the They.

Jägerstätter was an Austrian farmer primarily known for being a conscientious objector during World War II, refusing to swear the oath to Hitler despite pressure from fellow townsfolk, government officials, and the bishops and clergymen of the Catholic church to do so. Jägerstätter also repeatedly refused the call to fight even though he was trained as a soldier to fulfill his civic duty prior to coming to the realization of his objection. He had even sought exemptions by virtue of faith, or sheer objection, but was denied repeatedly and further pressured to fight. Does this resistance to pressure constitute a “remaining open to the possibilities of one’s being”? First, we must further consider the concept of the “They” and inauthenticity.

"We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back; we find 'shocking' what they find shocking. The "they", which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness."

Here, Heidegger is getting at the infiltrative capacities of the They in the Dasein’s understanding of itself and others, in which they determine or almost perform thinking for the Dasein, rather than the Dasein thinking for itself. Furthermore, it decides for the Dasein. It takes on decision as its own and deprives the Dasein of a more authentic agency. It also is a convenience for the Dasein, since the deprivation of its Being and agency are in this sense a relief of burden. Finally, it has a determinative power regarding Dasein’s concern for the world, in that it “articulates the referential context of significance”. The They-Self is a capacity inherent in all Dasein. Any participation in the They causes one to “belong to the Others oneself and enhance their power.”
The model of the conscientious objector responds to this if we consider the They as Dasein’s capacity to rely on rhetoric as a means for convenience and unthinking. Unthinking, here, is Dasein’s disregard for other ways of being in abiding by a dominant rhetoric. If the conscientious objector is truly “being-one’s-self” in this sense, then it does not bear the obstacles and disguises that cloud it from thinking for themselves, as their authentic discovery of the world and itself implies a “clearing away”.

Furthermore, Heidegger discusses the nature of these obscurities in the nature of “idle talk”. Idle talk is that type of discourse that loses its connection of Being-towards-the-entity aimed for and obscures that entity from its primordial ground. Heidegger then associates this kind of groundless speaking as that which “follows the route of gossiping and passing the world along”. This kind of groundless thought is what closes off Being-in-the-world and the ability to develop a cohabitating understanding concerning it since this discourse almost acts as an onslaught of disruptive chatter that makes discernment a much more difficult task. Idle talk is also conducive to the withering of genuine understanding, in that it releases the speaker from the task of truly considering one’s thoughts in the thoughtless repetition of rhetoric. Not only does this contribute to the withering of speech, but also “prescribes one’s state-of-mind", and determines what and how one sees. Heidegger ends this by discussing how Dasein becomes alienated from its primary relation to Being certain modalities: “Ontologically this means that when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk, it is-as Being-in the-world-cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very Being-in.” If the actions of the conscientious objector are driven mainly by a greater thoughtfulness and not merely through a thoughtlessness or indifference, then it might again be considered as acting against the They.

Heidegger then goes on to consider fallenness as the overarching state that idle talk falls under. Dasein’s fallenness isn’t necessarily dictated by external circumstances but by a predisposition toward falling toward the world. This is Dasein’s Being-in-the-world that it finds tempting. It finds that the world advertises a sense of authenticity, but this false form of authenticity rather neuters Dasein, hides its potential for Being, and sends it further into alienation. Fallenness might be considered in light of this because of what Heidegger later refers to as “turbulence”, or the character of falling. This is Dasein’s oscillation between authenticity and the They, which might shed light on the psychology of the objector in that it is not necessarily entirely resolute, but a struggle in itself.

Jägerstätter’s sentence to death might also be considered in light of Heidegger’s notion of Being-towards-death. For Heidegger, death is something that is impending for Dasein, as any Dasein in the world is already dying and has its own death in itself whether it is explicit or not. However, death is also that which reveals Dasein to itself, almost as the brokenness of equipment reveals its presence-to-hand to us. Death reveals Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being, in that death is the final possibility of Dasein: its own impossibility. For Dasein, death is that which it possesses the most, and that which is non-relational in that one ceases to have relations with others in the world once one ceases to be in it. It is also that which is “outstripped” because it supersedes any possibilities of Dasein in that it is the final possibility of its impossibility. Because of this, it is one of Dasein’s main constitutive conditions because Dasein’s thrown state into this inevitable possibility. This thrownness into death is what plunges Dasein into a state of anxiety related to facing death. And anxiety is that state of being in which Dasein simultaneously faces its death as well as its potentiality for being. And while Dasein can face its death as its death is an intrinsic part of Dasein, the immediacy of death can be expedited situationally, especially when Dasein’s being faces an explicit threat of imminent nothingness, considering Jägerstätter’s sentence to death. Whereas the They instinct of Dasein is to disregard one’s death and consider it as having nothing to do with us; to consider it as not present-at-hand and non-threatening for Dasein. Or, Dasein might orient themselves in a Being-towards-death that involves constant fleeing from it, which Heidegger refers again to as Dasein’s “falling”.

None of these are the case for the conscientious objector, especially if you consider the experience of jailing and death row for the objector, it will seem on the face of it that Jägerstätter would be in Heidegger’s terms, owning his own death and facing it with courage. Heidegger even discusses the fact of the They not permitting courage in light of anxiety towards death, as the interpretations of death have already been determined by the They. The imminence of death is also that which reveals Dasein’s entanglement in the they-self if it is encountered authentically and frees Dasein towards viewing its other possibilities. But this authenticity is one that is “primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude”. Therefore, one must also consider that the death for another does not fit under Heidegger’s framework. We must also take into account Jägerstätter’s faith in light of this, and whether or not his faith would operate as an opium for facing one’s death and even fleeing from the fact of it in the promise of eternal life.
Going further, Heidegger refers to another form of Dasein’s disclosing of its possibilities, which is through a “call to conscience”. This call to conscience need not be necessarily related to Being-towards-death but is Dasein’s ability to heed the call of its authentic self in the myriad noise of the idle talk of the They. Furthermore, this “call to conscience” is not necessarily an internal moral imperative, but rather a call from oneself to be oneself authentically.

This raises, however, an important consideration concerning reading the actions and behaviors of the conscientious objector into Heidegger’s work. Heidegger states thus in describing the goals of investigation:

“it may not be superfluous to remark that our own Interpretation is purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein, and from the aspirations of a 'philosophy of culture'.”

If moral concerns are an ontical/categorical designation and Heidegger’s concerns are rather that of fundamental ontology, or discovering the meaning of being underlying these ontic conceptions, wouldn’t attaching a moral dimension be improperly describing Heidegger’s work? I disagree for the reason that just because Heidegger’s work concerns the ontological that precedes and grounds the ontic doesn’t necessarily mean one can’t consider the system as being the grounds for moral behavior as well. As I see it, the existential structures of Being-in-the-world, as well as Being-with others, gesture toward a pre-moral framework that was merely not taken to its logical conclusion. Yes, these concepts still point toward an unknown of the meaning of Being underlying it. But by that logic, a study of the meaning of Being, especially for us, would imply an inextricability toward these kinds of ontic issues.

In conclusion, the reconciliation of the conscientious objector and Heidegger’s framework for authenticity remains unresolved. This is mainly due to our inability to know whether Jägerstätter’s actions were mainly guided by a sense of owned self and conscience, or through spiritual contingencies with possible reward in sight of making such a decision (going to heaven). However, if one considers the spiritual/moral boundaries to be blurred and even monistic rather than separate, one may be able to admit Jägerstätter’s case and reconsider Heidegger’s system in this light.

Works Cited
Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976, John. Macquarrie and Edward. Robinson. 1962. Being and
Time. [San Francisco, California], Harper San Francisco.